Main Page :- The Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus submitted by Lord Radcliffe (December 1956)


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I have the honour to present to you my recommendations for a new Constitution for Cyprus. I have drawn them up in the form of a single continuous document instead of expressing them in a series of separate recommendations and I hope therefore that they will be capable of speaking for themselves to those who read the document as a whole. At the same time I think it desirable that I should preface them with a brief commentary indicating what have presented themselves to me as the main features of my proposals and the reasons why I have preferred them to other possible arrangements which were proposed to me or which suggested themselves during the course of my work.

2. I am not attempting in this to present to you a formal Report. The conditions under which I have done my work and the general desire that I should make my proposals available within as short a space of time as circumstances allowed would have made that impossible, even if I thought that a comprehensive survey of the Cyprus problem could add much to what is already known and has been often said about its several intractable elements. My recommendations are, in effect, the best Report that I can make.

3. There are one or two preliminary points that I ought to make clear, so that my proposals should not be in danger of being considered in a setting in which I have not intended to place them. The first point is that, though, as requested, I have used all speed in bringing my proposals forward, I have not assumed that the Constitution they envisaged could be put into operation in Cyprus as it is to-day. It is a Constitution appropriate to a state of affairs in which men may express their will by voting and their views by speaking without fear of terrorism or intimidation : in which, on the other hand, Government does not have to impose or maintain those emergency measures, distorting ordinary life, which are the unavoidable counterpart of terrorism itself. In other words, my proposals contemplate a Cyprus in which it has been possible to declare that the present emergency has come to an end. I have no views as to when that time may come. Organised murder and violence have thrown a shadow over the Island which will only lift with the goodwill of many people. But it is possible to hope that the prospect of a Constitution with its fruitful possibilities of peaceful self-government may do something to bring nearer the end of the emergency itself.

4. The other point is that the Constitution which I am dealing with is the Constitution of a territory which is under the sovereignty of Her Majesty The Queen—that, in fact, is what is laid down in the first of my Terms of Reference. It is not therefore within the province of such a Constitution to provide for or to provide against the possibility of a change in the international status of Cyprus or to prescribe conditions or guarantees attendant upon the occurrence of such an event. On the contrary, I think it plain law that there is no power in the Legislature of a self-governing dependency to change the status of the territory by union under a different sovereign. Acts or resolutions directed to such a purpose would be null. If such changes were to come about, they would have to come about by other means and by instruments designed for the purpose. The Constitution as to which I am to make proposals is not one of them and I do not refer to the matter further.

5. It is convenient that at this stage I should set out in full my terms of reference which you communicated to me on the 13th day of September last.

"To make recommendations as to the form of a new Constitution for Cyprus which shall be consistent with the following requirements :-

(a) that during the period of the Constitution Cyprus is to remain under British sovereignty;

(b) that the use of Cyprus as a base is necessary for the fulfilment by Her Majesty's Government of their international obligations and for the defence of British interests in the Middle East and the interests of other Powers allied or associated with the United Kingdom;

(c) that all matters relating to external affairs, defence and internal security are retained in the hands of Her Majesty's Government or the Governor;

(d) that, subject to this, the Constitution is to be based on the principles of liberal democracy and is to confer a wide measure of responsible self-government on elected representatives of the people of Cyprus, but is at the same time to contain such reservations, provisions and guarantees as may be necessary to give a just protection to the special interests of the various communities, religions and races in the island."

6. I have not thought it my duty under this Commission to present to you as my proposals a draft of the complete instrument or instruments which would be needed to bring a Constitution into immediate operation. It would be premature to do so, anyway; but, apart from that, I know by experience that the niceties of legal phrasing and the accumulation of details which, though necessary, are not illuminating, tend to obscure for the reader the true purport of the whole scheme. What matters at this stage is the general outline, and it has throughout been my wish to keep that general outline as clear and simple as possible. My proposals are therefore to be read as instructions for a draftsman, not as a draft itself. I am afraid that in the result I cannot put them forward as being simple, because the complexity of the various interests that have to be recognised and provided for does preclude simplicity. A diarchy itself, such as results from the reservation of certain powers, is a complicated conception. But I hope that I have found a form of expression which is reasonably clear. For that purpose I have avoided technical language as far as I can, I have been explicit at points where much past experience suggests that it might nevertheless be wiser to substitute vagueness for precision and, though my draft has in the end become a great deal more detailed than at the beginning I hoped to find necessary, it does, I think, include everything that a reader, having appreciated the main ideas, would wish to know by way of detail in order to see how they are intended to be applied.

7. In constitutional proposals it is usual that two conflicting influences should weigh against each other. On the one hand there is the natural desire to define terms and to express meticulously the powers and limitations proposed. On the other hand, it is well to recognise that a written Constitution is no more than a legal framework for a political body in which there is inherent the capacity of growth and development. From the latter point of view too rigid a formulation is a positive mischance. I recognise this, and indeed it is hardly necessary to say that no Constitution under which political power is divided can provide answers to all questions or solutions to all problems. But in the conditions under which a Constitution is to be proposed for Cyprus I am firmly of the opinion that the preponderating advantage lies in constructing as precise a framework as is reasonably possible.

8. The conditions are so special that I ought briefly to indicate them. For the last 25 years Cyprus has been governed without political institutions that can be described as responsible or elective, except so far as certain organs of municipal or local self-government have filled the void. The maker of laws and the chief of administration has been the Governor, assisted, of course, by the advice of a Council and of his permanent officials. More than that, if one looks further back into the history of the Island, one sees that no established political tradition has had the opportunity of forming itself in Cyprus. In that setting to undertake the responsibilities of democratic self-government is inevitably to undertake an experiment with but little data to work upon. It seems to me only fair to all those who may be concerned in carrying out the experiment that they should be presented at the outset with as clear a picture as pencil can draw of the range and limits of their respective functions, rather than that the frontiers should be left to be defined by trial and error or constitutional convention. For I fear that under the stress of such day-to-day exploration the constitution itself might begin to crack.

9. There is a second consideration which argues the same way. The new distribution of political power which is involved in the very granting of the Constitution is a matter of the gravest concern to the different communities which make up the people of Cyprus. Whatever recommendations I make, they are bound to be scrutinised with a suspicious care by those who feel with justice that their future is staked upon the form such recommendations assume. I would like to hope that what I put forward will meet those misgivings. But in any event I think that it is to everyone's advantage that the guarantees proposed should be framed in as rigid and as inflexible a manner as may be—and by guarantees I do not mean merely the expression of what I have called in my draft the " fundamental rights " but I mean also the various special provisions, such, for instance, as the placing of broadcasting under public institutional control or the setting up of a Public Service Commission, which I put forward as being no less essential to the preservation of the rights of separate communities than the defined rights themselves. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to set up a representative Legislature in a British colonial territory under a constitution which unalterably limits its powers, unless the constitution is enacted by law of the United Kingdom Parliament itself. But for all that I do put forward what I propose as being in effect a rigid constitution, and the conditions which I suggest should govern any move to vary it on the part of the popular Assembly are such that there seems no practical likelihood of any variation on a matter of substance which affects the interests of the different communities. Even so, a law which seeks to vary the constitutional powers of the Legislative Assembly is one of the very few cases in which, according to my scheme, assent would be reserved by the Governor for Her Majesty and would not be a local matter for him as Governor of Cyprus.

10. There are two main problems involved in the framing of the Constitutional form. The first is, how to express the relationship between the control of external affairs, defence and internal security, which are reserved from the local Legislature, and the control of the other matters which will fall within the scope of that Legislature. The other is, how to impose such restrictions on the local Legislature as to secure effective protection—protection " with teeth "—for the minorities in the Island. When I use the word " minorities " I do not at all forget that the minorities are themselves racial communities which possess, though in varying degrees, historical traditions and religious, cultural and social bonds different from those of the majority race in Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot.

11. As to the first, it results from the reservation of powers that Cyprus will be governed under a system of diarchy. There will be two law-making authorities, their fields distinguished according to their subjects, and two distinct forms of administrative control. The idea of diarchy is familiar enough in the history of the developing relationship between the United Kingdom as an imperial Power and the overseas territories which have come within or passed without her central control. There is great variety in the forms in which it has been expressed—by subjecting Bills in the popular Assembly to the necessity of the Governor's consent before they can be introduced, by the use of an official majority, by leaving the Governor free to withhold assent from numerous categories of Bills if he considers that any one of them prejudices reserved or protected interests, by giving the Governor power to enact legislation on certain subjects in the name of the popular Legislature if the Legislature itself will not take the action required.

12. In the present case I have come to the conclusion that the most suitable form is that which recognises most explicitly the existence of the diarchy and its consequences. Accordingly I have proposed to invest the Governor with full law-making and executive power for his reserved field, and to leave the local Legislature correspondingly full master in its own field. There will thus be two systems of law-making existing side by side but separated according to the difference of subject with which they deal. I regard this as the system of diarchy which is simplest to present as a conception and which is most easily understood by those not concerned with the niceties of its application. If a public emergency should arise that of course must be dealt with by special provisions but it is better that the Crown should not retain any further reserved or supplemental powers of making laws for Cyprus by Order in Council, except the unavoidable power to alter the Order in Council itself which sets up the Constitution. It is better, I think, that the Governor and the local Legislature should be able to feel that, between them, they possess the full law-making powers for Cyprus, so long as the Constitution is in being and is honoured by observance.

13. I do not mean it as a hollow phrase when I say that under my proposals the local Legislature and, as a consequence, the Ministers responsible to it, are intended to be masters in their own, the non-reserved, field. It seems to me that a generous interpretation of my terms of reference in this respect is a fair exchange for the considerable reduction of the full possible scope of responsible self-government which results from the reservation of defence and internal security. Self-government is not, of course, a phrase with a single precise meaning nor does it connote a single identifiable form of government. It has in fact been used to cover a wide gradation of limited political systems amounting to less than full self-government. But in considering the possible application of such measures to a Constitution for Cyprus I have deliberately rejected schemes of " phasing," the progressive release of selected departments by stages into the hands of the self-governing side, each stage measured by proved success in the responsible handling of its predecessor. I do not think such an approach, however appropriate in other circumstances, is appropriate to this Cyprus Constitution. The people of Cyprus-, I have reminded myself, are an adult people enjoying long cultural traditions and an established educational system, fully capable of furnishing qualified administrators, lawyers, doctors and men of business. It is a curiosity of their history that their political development has remained comparatively immature. It is owed, I think, to a people so placed that, when they are invited to assume political responsibility, the offer should be generous in the sense that, within the field offered, no qualification or restriction should be imposed that is not honestly required by the conditions of the problem.

14. Consistently with this I have pared away from my proposals a number of those features that are often present in colonial constitutions, even those which represent a comparatively advanced stage of development. I have not proposed the introduction of any official members into the Legislative Assembly. I have proposed so restricted a number of nominated members, 6 out of a total of 36. that no one can suspect that they represent an obscure attempt to give the Governor a residual influence upon the elected body. On the other hand, nominated members do serve at least the convenient purpose of allowing the smaller minorities to obtain some representation without the formalities of separate communal rolls. In addition I propose that the categories of legislation as to which the Governor is to be free to reserve assent for Her Majesty's pleasure should be reduced to the bare minimum of four : Bills that seek to alter the Constitution in some respect, Bills affecting currency, coinage or foreign exchange, Bills affecting the Royal prerogative, and Bills affecting the trustee status of Cyprus Government stock. In all other matters that come within the self-governing field the Governor is to have the duty of a constitutional head of government to assent according to his Ministers' advice subject to reference to the Supreme Court for a judicial ruling upon any Bill that may appear to be itself repugnant to the various guarantees or restrictions which the Constitution imposes. Lastly, I have omitted altogether any provision for disallowance of Cyprus legislation by Her Majesty's Government except in the single case of legislation prejudicing the trustee status of Cyprus Government stock. In fact the retention of this particular power is needed for purely technical reasons in relation to such Government stock.

15. It is a familiar experience that when different fields of legislative or executive power are separated by reference to subjects as, for instance, in federal constitutions—there is on occasions a difficulty in deciding to which field a particular piece of legislation or executive act belongs. This difficulty will be liable to occur in Cyprus. Words such as " defence " or " internal security " do not carry a precise connotation. It is necessary therefore to face the question whether the dividing line can be drawn with any adequate precision by a process of defining a list of particular matters that fall within the range of these subjects. It would certainly be a great advantage if this could be done : for, if it could be done with even reasonable completeness, it would be possible to get rid of one of the most troublesome of those causes of dispute which disturb the relationship between the authorities responsible for the two sides of government. At any rate, even if the disputes remained, a means of resolving them by reasonable discussion would be available. And that perhaps is as much as anyone can hope to provide.

16. I am satisfied, however, that no good will be done by trying to provide exhaustive definitions. The truth of the matter is that it is the aspect or context in which a particular question presents itself that determines its relation to such subjects as defence or internal security rather than the intrinsic matter with which it deals. This consideration is especially relevant in the case of the Island of Cyprus which contains several very large military and air installations, themselves dependent for effective operation upon some measure of co-ordination with the rest of the Island, including its road communications, its ports and harbours and its water and power supplies. If one wereto begin to enquire what were the matters with which the authority responsible for defence and internal security might conceivably be concerned on some occasion or other, it would be very difficult to confine the list so as not to include quite a large number of those matters that are the normal preserve of internal self government. Some things are obviously the exclusive concern of defence and internal security, the control and discipline of the military forces or of the police force, for instance. Some things are likely for some purposes and on some occasions to touch upon defence and internal security, for instance compulsory acquisition of land and the importation of goods or immigration of persons. But it would not be easy to make any long list of those things of which it can certainly be said that they will not in any circumstance or for any purpose affect the interests of defence or internal security.

17. In that situation the balance of advantage turns against any further definition than is afforded by the description of the subjects themselves. For either external affairs, defence and internal security are defined by a long list of matters which covers all the things capable of coming within their range, even if ordinarily many of them will not : in which case the range of self-governing matters is materially reduced in order to take care of the exceptional occasion. Or, to avoid the inconvenience and unfairness of this, the interests of defence and internal security are to some extent jeopardised by tying them down to a limited range of matters which does not do justice to their possible legitimate range.

18. The solution which I propose involves three provisions which should be considered as interdependent upon each other.

(a)  The Governor must be the final judge both upon the question whether action that he feels it necessary to take in the interests of any of his reserved subjects is properly within their range and upon the obverse of this, whether a Bill of the Legislative Assembly presented for assent does or does not trench upon his reserved field. It is not possible to provide for the reference of such questions to an outside referee, such, for instance, as the Supreme Court. Defence and internal security involve matters which cannot be reasonably exposed or debated in public proceedings : moreover, they generally require positive and effective action, and it is not good sense that the validity of such action should be in suspense during the pendency of judicial proceedings.

(b) There should be a consultative body, formed on the highest level, for the purpose of keeping each side—the reserved side and the self-governing side—currently informed as to what the other is doing and, perhaps more important, what it proposes to do and why. Such a body should meet under the chairmanship of the Governor himself and from the start it should aim to meet frequently and to discuss fully. The membership that I propose would consist of Governor and Deputy Governor, Chief Minister and another Minister nominated by him, Minister of Turkish Cypriot Affairs, a representative of the Defence forces, Legal Secretary and Attorney-General. In a body of this kind criticisms can be made and policies explained with a freedom and lack of reserve that could not be expected in an open deliberative Assembly. I have suggested that this body should be styled the Joint Council of Cyprus and I suggest that name in order to mark the importance that I attach to its existence and its functions. Given reasonable good will on the two sides I believe that such an institution could be effective to iron out the many possible causes of friction to which a diarchy gives rise and of which the greater part has its origin in each side's ignorance of what the other is up to and the suspicions and lack of confidence arising from such ignorance.

(c) It is only a development of the idea which lies behind the Joint Council of Cyprus to propose, as I do, that the Governor should have constitutional power to invite the Legislative Assembly to take over from him any particular piece of law-making which, though founally within his reserved field, he can conveniently commit to the self-governing side. A power of this kind seems to me a valuable one. It provides the flexibility along that difficult frontier between what is reserved and what not that everyone would wish to see so long as it is felt that no true interest of defence or internal security is prejudiced by looseness of definition. And it affords a means by which to avoid, again given good will, what might otherwise look like an unexpected inroad by the reserved side into the normal field of self-government. It is my hope that as confidence grows, this power might be increasingly resorted to.

19. I have been critical to examine whether the scheme that I propose for regulating the relations between the reserved side and the self-governing side does in any true sense deny to the latter a generous opportunity of occupying the field of self-government. I am satisfied that it does not. It would be a distortion of the picture to allow the circumstance that at some places and on some occasions the Governor may have to deal with matters that would normally be self-governing matters to suggest that in most places or on most occasions the self-governing field will be invaded in this way. There is no reason why it should be. It will be the Governor's duty to promote the most harmonious relationship that he can achieve between the two sources of authority in the Island, sources which unite him in his two capacities, in one capacity as constitutional head, in the other as autocratic delegate of the Imperial Government.

20. Perhaps the simplest test of the reality of self-government under the system I have envisaged is to recite the names of the Ministries which I have provided for on the self-governing side (apart from the Chief Minister's Office and the Office of Minister for Turkish Cypriot Affairs): Development, Interior and Local Government, Finance, Communications and Works, Social Services, Natural Resources. It is true that these do not correspond to the existing Departments of Government, though they provide convenient groupings of them. But, to translate them into the Departments or Branches of Government as known to the Cypriot to-day I have invited the Administration in Cyprus to draw up a provisional list of those departments or branches which under my scheme might be expected to pass into the self-governing field and so under the Ministerial control of persons responsible to the elected Assembly. I set it out accordingly in the Appendix to this Covering Note.

21. I turn now to the problems of the self-governing side itself, having explained my proposals as to its relationship with the reserved powers. One thing I can draw attention to at once. My general conception is that the Governor should withdraw from active intervention in the work of the self-governing side, assuming instead the important, but different, status of the constitutional " head " on Her Majesty's behalf. Generally speaking, therefore, he will act on the advice of his Ministers, he will not preside at or take part in meetings of the Cabinet or of the Legislative Assembly. Certain decisions must be taken and acts performed on his own authority, as in the case of any other constitutional head. They will all however be found explicitly identified in my proposed scheme. Thus only he can decide on such matters as proroguing and dissolving the Assembly, relieving a Chief Minister of his office, the making of certain appointments, the reference of doubtful Bills to the Supreme Court for advice, the power of pardon. These citations are not exhaustive, but the full list is not a long one.

22. With this said, the chief problem in finding a suitable framework for the powers of self-government is so to design them that on the one hand self-government becomes a means of reflecting truly the will and purpose of the people of Cyprus and on the other it does not become an instrument by which a majority drawn from one community overrides the legitimate claims of a minority community to maintain its own life and customs as an integral part of the life and customs of Cyprus.

23. Everyone knows that Cyprus is not homogeneous. Taking the figures of the 1946 Census (and I have no reason to suppose that since then there has been any substantial change in favour of minorities), the population of the Island is formed, as to about 80 per cent., of Greek Cypriots, as to about 18 per cent., of Turkish Cypriots, and the remaining 2 per cent. consists of smaller communities of British residents, Armenians, Maronites and others. Throughout I take no account of the British armed forces who will be present in the territory from time to time in connection with the base.

24. The influences that make for separation between the communities are strong—religion, language, education, tradition, and custom. They are reflected in the towns by separate quarters for Greek and Turk : in the country by Turkish villages and Greek villages. On the other hand there is only a weak supply of unifying elements which would make for a general consciousness that all the communities are Cypriot communities. True all these statements are generalisations to which there are exceptions. The degree of separation between Greek and Maronite Cypriot must be small to-day. Not all education is special to its own community : there are one or two valuable institutions in which boys from all communities receive the same education side by side. There are mixed villages shared by Greek and Turk. Many Turks speak Greek as well as Turkish, and the English language is a potential instrument of common understanding. But communal separation remains the general factor.

25. How far this separation would be reflected in ability of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to work together politically, I could not say. I am conscious that I do not know enough about the problem. Their representatives have worked together in the past in the service of the Government, in municipal administration, in the activities of co-operative societies and of district improvement boards. In some cases the combination seems to have been happy and unresentful : in others there seem to have been recurring suspicions and complaints on the side of the Turkish Cypriots that discrimination has been practised against them. Whatever the truth of the matter, I have no doubt at all that the circumstances of the last 18 months and the pressure of the Greek Cypriot campaign for Enosis have done much to sharpen the sense of alienation between the two communities, and I think that any plan for the future must accept the fact of this alienation as present now and in the future.

26. The problem comes down to the political relations between these two communities. The figures that I have given show that the remaining communities are too small in numbers for it to be reasonable that they should expect to have anything more than the right to have their voices heard in an elected Assembly and the right to share in the protection of any guarantees that limit the powers of the majority in that Assembly. In fact the representatives of the Armenian community told me that they did not desire to have any special arrangements made for their representation as a community. Their best protection lay in good government for all rather than in separate identification of different interests.

27. I have given my best consideration to the claim put before me on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community that they should be accorded political representation equal to that of the Greek Cypriot community. If I do not accept it I do not think that it is out of any lack of respect for the misgivings that lie behind it. But this is a claim by 18 per cent. of a population to share political power equally with 80 per cent., and, if it is to be given effect to, I think that it must be made good on one of two possible grounds. Either it is consistent with the principles of a constitution based on liberal and democratic conceptions that political power should be balanced in this way, or no other means than the creation of such political equilibrium will be effective to protect the essential interests of the community from oppression by the weight of the majority. I do not feel that I can stand firmly on either of these propositions.

28. The first embodies the idea of a federation rather than a unitary State. It would be natural enough to accord to members of a federation equality of representation in the federal body, regardless of the numerical proportions of the populations of the territories they represent. But can Cyprus be organised as a federation in this way? I do not think so. There is no pattern of territorial separation between the two communities and, apart from other objections, federation of communities which does not involve also federation of territories seems to me a very difficult constitutional form. If it is said that what is proposed is in reality nothing more than a system of functional representation, the function in this case being the community life and organisation and nothing else, I find myself baffled in the attempt to visualise how an effective executive government for Cyprus is to be thrown up by a system in which political power is to remain permanently divided in equal shares between two opposed communities. Either there is stagnation in political life, with the frustration that accompanies it, or some small minority group acquires an artificial weight by being able to hold the balance between the two main parties. A third alternative, that the Governor should be given under the Constitution some sort of arbitral position as between the two communities, I have already excluded by what I have said above. I do not think that it will be advantageous to embroil the Governor in the internal controversies of the self-governing side. My conclusion is that it cannot be in the interests of Cyprus as a whole that the constitution should be formed on the basis of equal political representation for the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

29. Does the second ground lead to a different result? I do not think so. To give an equal political strength in a unitary State to two communities which have such a marked inequality in numbers—an inequality which, so far as signs go is as likely to increase as decrease—is to deny to the majority of the population over the whole field of self-government the power to have its will reflected in effective action. Yet it might well be right to insist on this denial if the Constitution could not be equipped with any other effective means of securing the smaller communities in the possession of their essential special interests. Not only do I think that it can be equipped with such means by placing those interests under the protection of independent tribunals with appropriate powers and relying only to a limited extent on direct political devices, but I think that the " legalist " solution which this depends on is in fact better suited to provide the protection that is required, and it does not have the effect of denying the validity of the majority principle over a field much wider than that with which special community interests are truly concerned.

30. At this point I will set out the main features of my proposals-which are designed to protect the special interests of the Turkish Cypriot community and its political status.

(a) There will be 6 seats in the Legislative Assembly reserved for members elected on a separate roll of Turkish Cypriot voters. This number is to be compared with 24 seats for members elected on a general roll, in effect a roll of Greek Cypriot voters, and is very slightly more than the proportion attributable to the respective numbers of the two communities. My proposal to introduce 6 nominated members in addition has no material bearing on this and their class must in any event take care of nominees to represent other communities, such as non-Cypriot British residents and Maronites.

(b) The consent of two-thirds of the Turkish Cypriot members will be necessary before the Assembly can pass any law which alters the existing laws of Cyprus regulating Turkish Cypriot domestic affairs, marriage, divorce, Evkaf and Vakfs, &c., or which deals with their educational, religious, charitable or cuLural institutions. On the other hand the Turkish Cypriot community can invite the Governor to make a regulation amending any of those laws if there is no prospect of the Assembly itself being willing to act.

(c) There will be a branch of the permanent administration styled the Office of Turkish Cypriot Affairs under a Minister appointed by the Governor from among the Turkish Cypriot members of the Legislative Assembly. It will be the Government organ for dealing with all the special affairs of the community, including its separate schools and educational system, and will have an allotted share of the Cyprus revenues appropriated for the purpose.

(d) The Minister for Turkish Cypriot Affairs will have a seat in the Cabinet ex officio and will be a" member of the Joint Council of Cyprus.

(e) All legislative acts of the Assembly and all executive and administrative actions or decisions on the self-governing side will be subject to the condition that they must not conflict with certain guaranteed rights relating to religion, education, charitable, religious and cultural institutions and use of languages. Further there must be no discrimination based on birth, nationality, language, race or religion. The independent tribunals to whom complaints about violation of these rights can be preferred will be the Supreme Court, in the case of legislative acts, and the body which I have styled the Tribunal of Guarantees, in the case of executive or administrative actions of Government. If a complaint against a legislative act is upheld, the act, or at least the offending part of it, becomes a nullity. If it is an executive or administrative action that is successfully challenged, the Tribunal will have a discretion as to how best to deal with it including a power to award compensation to a person injured.

31. These are the main, but not the only, provisions which I have proposed for the safeguarding of the position of the Turkish Cypriot community. 1 here are others, minor in themselves, which yet make up in combination a system under which the community is secure of its place in the conduct of public affairs. It is my hope that together they will be thought to justify the view that, even under a system which concedes an electoral majority to the Greek Cypriots in the Legislative Assembly, the interests of the smaller community can be effectively protected and that the safeguards that are offered are not mere " paper " guarantees.

32. I have passed over several points in setting out my conclusion, and I return to those of them which need explanation. For instance, I do not propose that the Legislature of Cyprus should comprise a second Chamber. While I have been conscious of what I may call some general expectation that my proposals would include a recommendation of a second Chamber, I have been much less clear what was the purpose that such a Chamber would be intended to serve. Yet there is no point in designing all the complications of a bi-cameral Legislature unless the designer is clear what are the advantages to be secured by thus duplicating the legislative authority.

33. A second Chamber may serve various purposes. It may act as a substantive check on the activities of the first Chamber in the sense that nothing can become law that does not secure the support of a majority in each Chamber. But then the second Chamber must have a membership constituted on a principle different from that of the first Chamber. Otherwise the check is illusory. I have met suggestions that there should be a second Chamber for Cyprus formed on a functional principle of representation, comprising representatives of municipalities, religious, educational, and business organisations, trade unions, &c. So there might be, in theory. But the idea offers no solution in itself. First, the significance of such a Chamber in acting as an effective check upon the other Chamber depends entirely upon the weighting that is given to the different bodies represented as between the two opposed communities. In deciding on the weighting one transfers to the formation of the second Chamber just the same controversy on a matter of principle that I have been discussing with regard to the first. And an answer has to be given, one way or the other, to the same question—Is it right to deny validity to the will of the majority for general political purposes? Secondly, I am bound to say that a scheme of functional representation for a political body, though attractive to me in theory, is not one which I would be ready to recommend for introduction into Cyprus unless I had had much more opportunity than I have had for working out its actual composition with the help of Cypriot representatives on the spot. Certainly, I could not put it forward as a system of representation that is usual or widely used to-day.

34. But then a second Chamber can serve other purposes than that of being a full partner in the Legislative body. It can be designed to act as a limited check upon the first Chamber, either by exercising a power to delay, though not finally to prevent, the realisation of the will of the first or by acting as a revising agent, subject of course, to the readiness of the first Chamber to accept the revisions proposed. No doubt these are useful functions, though they may seem more attractive to the members of a second Chamber that has dwindled from the historical status of full partner than to the members of a new body created from the first to serve no wider purpose. But I do not think that their utility is sufficient to justify the introduction of two separate Chambers into the Legislature proposed for Cyprus. The political field must, after all, be a comparatively small one; and the advantage lies in looking for an arrangement which will concentrate all the best available talent in one deliberative and law-making body, rather than for an arrangement that will dissipate that talent among two separate bodies. Incidentally, the work of revision does not essentially require the existence of two separate Chambers. It can be carried out, not necessarily with less ultimate effectiveness, by a special committee of a single Chamber, with or without expert assistance from outside. On the whole, therefore, I came to the conclusion that no sufficient advantage would be gained by a bi-cameral structure, when there had to be set on the debit side the importance of simplicity, of facing a single Chamber squarely with the responsibility for its own decisions, of avoiding distracting controversies between the two Chambers, and, lastly, of bringing all the available political talent into a single responsible assembly.

35. If a second Chamber is favoured as itself the means of protecting minority rights I can only say that I do not think that it would be likely to prove a good instrument for that purpose. Compared with a system that allows resort to a competent and independent tribunal, I think it a poor one. In fact it is difficult to see how it can avoid going too far or not far enough. Either it gives the minority a general political power more extensive than is required for its proper protection, thereby distorting the political distribution, or it makes the minority judge in its own cause as to what its special interests are and what is needed for their protection : or on the other hand, avoiding this, it gives the minority no more than a nuisance value and so fails to achieve even its legitimate intention.

36. With regard to the franchise I recommend the simplest scheme that is possible. I believe this to be the best way to launch the Cyprus Constitution among all the controversies that will attend its birth. Accepting as I do the necessity of a separate communal roll for Turkish Cypriots, I have enquired whether it would be possible to propose some mitigation of the drawbacks of thus perpetuating communal separation by introducing into Cyprus some scheme for a common roll upon which both Turkish Cypriot and all other voters would have an additional vote for a limited number of candidates. Such candidates, it might be hoped, conscious of their dependence upon a mixed constituency of voters, would be less likely to pursue strictly communal policies than candidates elected on separate rolls. I think that perhaps they would, and the idea that lies behind such schemes may well commend itself to Cypriot statesmen of the future. If so, measures can be taken to introduce it if it has the necessary support. But there is little experience available as to how such schemes have worked out in practice, and any version of this double franchise would present the voter in Cyprus with a more complicated election issue than I think appropriate for the opening stages of popular self-government. Besides, theory is one thing and electoral management is another : and in the shortage of experience, I do not feel any sufficient confidence as to the results of such a scheme in practice. A similar conviction of the importance of insisting on all possible simplicity in the franchise arrangements has led me to propose that there should be no option for Turkish Cypriots to register on the general roll. It seems to me inconsistent with the plan of guaranteeing the community a number of seats proportionate to its total numbers that it should be possible for members of the community to leave the necessary minimum on the separate roll to cover those seats and transfer the residue of their voting power to the election on the general roll.

37. In one matter I have departed on my own responsibility from the franchise rule which previously held good in Cyprus and which was, as I understand, proposed to be retained in more recent discussions on a new Constitution. I propose that women should be admitted as voters equally with men. I cannot think that this is any great innovation, since they already enjoy the vote for certain purposes of local government. Considering that female franchise is now so widely accepted and that it is in operation in the United Kingdom, in Greece, and in Turkey, I think that if I proposed adherence to the old rule of male franchise I might be thought to be recommending a form of self-government for Cyprus that deliberately departed from liberal or progressive ideas. That would be an unfortunate misunderstanding.

38. I hope that my proposals as to the position of the Supreme Court and the Tribunal of Guarantees speak for themselves. It is plain enough that I am attaching great importance to the contribution that the judicial power can make to the resolution of inter-communal disputes in Cyprus. And, if inter-communal disputes can be resolved, a large part of the political difficulties of self-government disappears with them. It is indeed a grave responsibility for a judicial tribunal to decide upon the validity of legislative acts or to confirm or annul the administrative acts of Government. But it is, after all, a judicial function that has been discharged acceptably by the Courts of many countries under many systems. The first great written Constitution of modern democracy, that of the United States, owes its interpretation and a large measure of its development to the claim asserted by its Supreme Court to be, the final arbiter whether legislative acts of Congress were valid or invalid under the Constitution. And the judicial power has been allotted a similar responsibility under the federal Constitutions of Canada and Australia. there is no necessary connection between a federal Structure and a judicial power to decide whether legislative acts are repugnant to the Consitution. Indeed the Governor's power, which I propose to refer a doubtful Bill to the Supreme Court for advice before giving assent is modelled fairly closely on a similar provision in the Constitution of the Republic of Eire.

39. It may be said that Cyprus is a small stage when compared with these territories, and I have asked myself critically whether the duty that I seek to lay upon its Judges is not too heavy for the circumstances of the case. Can they not only achieve the detachment required but also obtain from the public the credit for that detachment? Both are necessary, if their responsibility is to be discharged. I can only say, after going into the matter, that I believe that both objects can be realised, provided that one condition is accepted. The Chief Justice himself must be appointed from outside Cyprus and the number of Supreme Court Judges from inside Cyprus must always be equally balanced between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot. Given a President of the Court who by virtue of his origin is uncommitted to either community in the eyes of the public, I do not feel any misgivings as to the confidence that will be placed in the Judges' impartiality. The Cyprus judiciary enjoys a high reputation for conscientious performance of its duties and I think that, so formed, the Supreme Court can safely be entrusted with the responsibility that I propose.

40. The Tribunal of Guarantees is, so far as I know, a novelty in any Constitutional scheme derived from British sources, though it may be recognised as a reflection on a very small scale of the Conseil d'Etat in France. I think that it will be a useful institution. I was impressed by the point reiterated to me that, if there is a tendency by members of one community to discriminate at the expense of the members of another, it is at least as likely that the discriminating will be found in the administrative as in the legislative field. I agree with this and while I do not assume that discrimination has been an abuse in Cyprus in the past—though I am aware of complaints on the matter—nor do I assume that it will be the more present in the future, I think that it is advantageous to provide for a tribunal to which all complaints can be preferred and impartially investigated. The reason why I do not regard this as work altogether suitable for the Supreme Court is partly that it would be unfortunate to risk overloading that Court with a number of inquiries that are not legal matter in the strict sense and partly that the experience and, I think, the practice and procedure which best suits such a tribunal is rather different from that appropriate to a regular Court of Law. But the need for an independent Chairman remains the same.

41. I have now completed my brief commentary on the main outline of my proposals. But there are two activities for which the Government of Cyprus is either responsible or with which it is directly concerned that I have not found it possible to fit into my general scheme of self-government without imperilling the basis of equitable protection for each community upon which it is constructed. One of these activities is broadcasting, the Cyprus Broadcasting Service being at present a branch of Government itself : the other is those educational activities, either conducted by Government or aided by it, which are not reserved for individual communities.

42. To explain the problem raised by these two activities I must clear the ground by stating my general assumptions as to the control of education and information under self-government. The present Department of Education provides out of public funds the major part of the cost of all elementary education, which is carried on in separate schools and under separate systems according to the community concerned. Secondary education, with the exceptions that I have referred to above, is also the separate concern of each community, Greek and Turkish Cypriot. Virtually no Greek Cypriot secondary school is in receipt of Government grant at present; on the other hand grants are received by Turkish Cypriot secondary schools. With the institution of self-government it is to be supposed that governmental relations with Greek Cypriot education will be handled by a department of education under a Greek Cypriot Minister, while Government relations with Turkish Cypriot education will come under the Office of Turkish Cypriot Affairs and its Minister. Information and public relations in general will pass to the self-governing side; but that will not preclude the Governor from setting up independently whatever office for information and public relations relating to his reserved matters he may think necessary for their presentation.

43. Broadcasting does not fit into such a scheme of division. It is as much a normal internal service for the use of Cyprus as, say, electric power and water and, as such, should fall among self-governing matters. On the other hand, it is most important for the future happiness of the island and its people that broadcasting should be kept secure from the impact of party or political controversies and, above all, from any tendency to favour one community at the expense of another. Yet no one who has had experience of the problems of controlling the output of a medium such as broadcasting could suppose that impartiality could be effectively enforced by an outside tribunal, as the Tribunal of Guarantees, or by any form of external reference. Semel emissum volat irrevocabile verbum. The essential things, balance. allocation of times, impartial presentation, depend on a right system at the source. I do not think, therefore, that it affords a proper protection for the minority communities that broadcasting should be treated merely as one of the normal incidents of self-government and should pass accordingly under the control of a Minister responsible to the elected majority in the Legislative Assembly.

44. Is there then an acceptable alternative? It would be possible, in theory, to place broadcasting under the control of the Governor himself, not as a reserved or security matter but as a special inter-communal service which he should hold as an impartial trustee for all communities. Yet I cannot bring myself to favour this as a solution. It runs counter to the general line of policy which I recommend, that of withdrawing the Governor from active embroilment in the controversies which may divide the two main communities. Fortunately there is an alternative arrangement which presents itself as much to be preferred.

45. What I recommend is that broadcasting should be turned into a chartered public institution, on the lines of the B.B.C., charged with an independent public responsibility so to conduct the service as to hold a fair balance between the interests and claims of the different communities. I do not think that one can define the duty except in some vague general terms such as these. The important thing is that those in control of the service should be and should be recognised as being independent of external control or pressure as to all matters relating to the content and handling of the output. For this purpose the composition of the governing board needs rigid definition. My proposal is that it should be so formed that Greek and Turkish Cypriots have equal representation upon it and that, if a difference has to be weighed in the scales, the vote of an independent Chairman should decide between them. It does not seem to matter in this case whether he comes from inside or outside the Island, so long as he is not thought to be committed to either side. But I do not think that a member of the public service in Cyprus would be suitable for the appointment.

46. There are two points that I ought to stress before leaving the subject of broadcasting. One is that my proposal does not merely involve that the conduct of broadcasting as an independent public institution would be a good way of starting off under a self-governing Constitution. It is much more than that. It involves that this method of treating broadcasting as an essential feature of the distribution of powers under the Constitution is in its own way as much a guarantee of minority rights as other more obvious provisions. The other is that I do mean that those who conduct the service should be genuinely free from outside control as to its content : and that this applies to the Governor as much as to any other political authority. This principle does not exclude reasonable provisions in the Charter regulating access to the service for the dissemination of official notices and information.

47. My second problem is concerned with inter-communal education. This rather uncouth phrase denotes those activities in the Cyprus educational system which are not confined to any one community. As they stand they can be set down on a very short list—the English School for boys at Nicosia, the American Academy for boys at Larnaca, the American Academy for girls at Nicosia, the Teachers' Training College for men, the Teachers' Training College for women. In addition plans are now maturing for certain commercial and technical schools to be conducted by Government : and an impressive Technical Institute is nearing the completion of its layout at Nicosia. The current cost to Government of its part in the whole activity is of the order of £150,000. It is envisaged that it may rise to £500,000 when present plans are completed, but there are capital sums of some £1½ million that will need to be found apart from what is already earmarked in the Cyprus Development Fund.

48. Certain things can be said without argument about these activities. The English School is not a school for the English any more than the American Academy is a school for Americans : they are schools in which Greek, Turkish, Armenian and other Cypriot boys are educated together. Nor is the English School or the American Academy a place for administering English or American educational systems to young Cypriots or for trying to impose upon them any new national loyalties. What they do is to provide a different curriculum from that in force in the separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot secondary schools and an approach to education which, just because they are inter-communal, is based on a rather wider and more general conception of its purpose. It is one of the admirable characteristics of the people of Cyprus that they have a sincere appreciation of the importance and value of education. The education offered by the intercommunal schools is, so experience shows, much sought after by parents, as are the opportunities afforded by Government scholarship grants to obtain the advantages of higher education outside Cyprus. Such a system of education cannot honestly be regarded as a challenge to the separate systems which are followed in the Greek and Turkish Cypriot secondary schools or as a threat to bring about " dehellenisation " in the Greek schools—a threat to which members of the Greek Cypriot community have been sensitive during the period of direct Governor's rule. But the inter-communal system and all its intangible advantages arising from the mixing of the children of the different communities at the formative period of education do provide a valuable supplement to the other, separate, systems of education. Taking a reasonably long view, such a means of education provides, as I see it, one of the most hopeful paths toward a mitigation of the racial separations which are at the bottom of the problem of Cyprus. And it is a path which no one is compelled to take. Those who enter on it enter by their parents' free choice.

49. What then is to become of inter-communal education under the new Constitution? It does not fit into the pattern of the Greek Cypriot department of education or the office of Turkish Cypriot Affairs. It is by its nature a service that bridges the two without belonging to either. If it passes, as a general subject of self-government, into the control of a Minister responsible to an elected majority in the Legislative Assembly, I think that it may well be putting too heavy a burden upon him to expect him to support it and to further its possible developments in the face of hostile opposition from those who can see good only in the traditional curriculum of Greek Cypriot separate education. So either we must face the possibility or the probability that this activity, however beneficial to Cyprus, will be allowed to fail through lack of the means of support, or an exception must be made to secure its continuance by placing the instruments of inter-communal education under a special board responsible to the Governor, not to the Legislative Assembly. A board formed for this purpose should in my view invite the assistance of Greek and Turkish Cypriot' members interested in education, but should have an independent Chairman. This is the expedient that I propose. I will mention later what I regard as the financial implications of such an arrangement.

50. It only remains for me to give such explanations as seem called for with regard to the financial provisions which are set out in Section P of the constitutional proposals. I have left it to the last to deal with these points, since I take it to be an uncontroversial principle that the financial arrangements should be adjusted to suit the substantive proposals rather than that those proposals should themselves be subordinated to some fixed financial conceptions which may be ill-suited to the very special circumstances in which a new Constitution for Cyprus would have to be set on foot.

51. The diarchy which is involved in the reserved powers over defence and internal security involves in my view that there will be two separate public funds for Cyprus, one controlled by the Governor for the purpose of those fields of administration which are retained in his charge, the other being the produce of the Cyprus revenues which will be available to be raised and appropriated according to the decisions of the self-governing Assembly and Ministers.

52. The monies needed for the purpose of defence in Cyprus will be provided, I assume, from United Kingdom funds and will not be regarded as a charge upon the revenues of Cyprus except to the extent of the sum of £10,000 which is its standing annual contribution to Imperial defence. I am not concerned to express a view upon the question whether £10,000 or some larger sum is the right figure for this purpose, but I think it almost obvious that the very large sums which are being expended in Cyprus over a period of years towards its full equipment as a base are not expended for the defence of Cyprus itself regarded in the limited sense as a territory unconnected with the British defence system as a whole. It is relevant that these large demands on labour and material and the consumption demands of the troops stationed on base duty do, and will, bring considerable prosperity to the Island out of the United Kingdom money spent there, even though most of it is not an expenditure economically productive. This may be a good reason for increasing the fixed charge of £10,000 which for my purposes I have assumed as the contribution figure. But I do not think that anyone would suppose that it alters the general principle that Cyprus revenues cannot properly be charged with the creation and development of the defence base.

53. The next item is the cost of internal security. which in substance is the cost of the Police Force and the prison service. What difficulties there are in providing for this cost can be discussed in terms of the Police and I will confine my explanation to this. The question that I have had to face is this : Should the cost of the Police Force be met out of the revenues of Cyprus, although the control of that force, including its strength, equipment, rates of pay, &c., is a reserved matter and not therefore within the range of self-government? I think that a question of this sort is peculiar to the special system which is proposed for Cyprus under which the police power is a reserved power. Internal security is, of course, a necessary service to civilised government. That means that self-government in Cyprus could not exist without some police force and the expenditure needed to maintain it and I deduce from that that it would be wrong that nothing should be required from Cyprus revenues to pay for Police, even though the control of the force is not on the self-governing side. But does it follow from that that the whole cost of the force should be found by Cyprus? That conclusion is a very big jump from the first, and I have not been able to persuade myself that it would be just to impose this charge when the special circumstances that affect the Cyprus police force are understood. In my view the only fair thing is some sharing arrangement.

54. What is happening is that the Cyprus Police force is undergoing a thorough reorganisation. The outbreak of the emergency in April 1955 is thought to have shown up serious deficiencies in numbers, training and organisation. The scheme of reorganisation is only now getting under way and it will be years before it will be completed according to the new scale that is designed for it. One or two figures will show the measure of the change. In 1954 the Police expenditure was about £600,000. The establishment authorised at the close of that year was Officers 51, Other Ranks 1,363. The total strength as recommended by the recent Report of the Cyprus Police Commission, 1956, and accepted by the Government is approximately 3,000 all ranks, rather more than double. Disregarding special expenditure which will not recur when the emergency is over, the future level of recurrent expenditure planned for Police is some £2,625,000 to £3,125,000 and that on Prisons is in the region of £125,000. To this must be added a very considerable capital expenditure on rehousing the police and on new buildings, which plan, if fully implemented, will require another £5 million over the next five years.

55. None of this expenditure will be controllable by the Legislative Assembly. No doubt Police matters will be canvassed in the Joint Council of Cyprus, but the responsibility for the strength and organisation of the Force will remain with the Governor. I do not think that the situation would be improved if an official representative were to attend the Legislative Assembly and answer questions relating to the Police. It could be done, but where there is neither control of finance nor control of policy I doubt if question and answer are a useful expedient.

56. The total Cyprus revenue for 1956 was about £12 million, itself representing a remarkable advance over recent years due largely to the pressure of defence expenditure. Even if £12 million* is taken as a representative annual figure, it looks as if about 25 per cent. of it would be needed to be appropriated for Police costs, if the whole burden were to be thrown on Cyprus.

57. My conclusion is that it would be unjust to Cyprus to make such a requirement, whatever the future level of Cyprus revenues. I ought to say, though, that I have not detected any reason for supposing that they will show much increase in the next few years, while one item of importance may well decline. I think that it would be a bad thing to try to start constitutional self-government on a financial basis that is itself unfair. Internal security and defence are separate subjects, but they are not entirely distinct. It seems to me only reasonable to say that the necessity to create and to maintain a thoroughly effective police force in Cyprus is in part a recognition that we must be secure in the use of our base. What I recommend therefore is that a sum should be fixed as an annual contribution from the Cyprus revenues towards the total cost of Police and Prisons, to be paid into the Defence Fund, and that the balance should be provided by Her Majesty's Government out of United Kingdom funds. I thought it reasonable, if a formula had to be found, to turn to 1954, the year before the emergency broke out, to find a " normal " basis for police expenditure in Cyprus and then to write the figure up to the higher scales prevailing in 1956. That has produced the figure of £750,000 for Police and Prisons that I use in my proposals. I ought to add that, though I am firmly committed to the principle of sharing, I am not committed to the actual figure. Considering how deficient even the 1954 establishment (it was not filled) may be thought to have been shown to be in the light of what has happened since, my figure may be rather too favourable to Cyprus.

58. With regard to broadcasting I do not find that the same difficulties arise. It is a service for the people of Cyprus in the full sense : and the mere fact that the need to safeguard the different interests of the various communities has led me to propose that its control should not be placed under the elected Assembly does not provide any good reason why the finance for it, so far as it is not self-financing out of licences and advertisements, should not continue to be met out of Cyprus revenues. I have no right to suppose that it will at any time be self-financing. It runs at a deficit of some £100,000 at present. When a planned extension of facilities has been completed, as it shortly will be, it is hoped to reduce the annual deficit to a figure in the region of £50,000. What I propose is that the annual estimates should be approved by the Governor in consultation with the Minister of Finance and the Minister for Turkish Cypriot Affairs. He should then be empowered to send a precept to the Finance Minister for the amount required to meet the estimated deficit and the sum so certified will thus become a charge on Cyprus revenues. I recommend also that the Broadcasting Corporation's annual accounts should be laid before the Legislative Assembly with a report on them by the Auditor-General.

* The figure of 12 million was taken from the official Estimates for 1956, presented by the Governor to the Executive Council on 27th March, 1956. After the submission of this Report it was brought to my notice that Cyprus revenue for 1956 is now estimated as likely to amount to about £13.5 million ; on the other hand the expenditure for the same period is expected to increase still more, above the previous estimates. These facts should be recorded ; but the point that paragraph 56 is dealing with remains the same.

59. There remains the financing of inter-communal education. Valuable as such education is, it is not nor is it likely to be a major item of anyone's budget. As I have said, even allowing for planned developments, its annual cost to Government is not expected to be more than £500,000. And the enquiries that I have made do not suggest that, with the shortage of suitable teachers and facilities, any large-scale development could be undertaken in any near future. But what fund ought to bear the charge of it? It is in the same situation as broadcasting in the sense that it is purely a Cyprus service for the benefit of Cypriots : on the other hand, unlike broadcasting, and pro tanto, the police, it is not a necessary service, since it merely supplements other systems of education for the benefit of those parents who wish their children to be educated in this way. For reasons that I have explained I am proposing that inter-communal education should be placed under the Governor, with the help of an education board on which Greek and Turkish Cypriots will be equally represented. Neither its maintenance nor its possible development will therefore be under the control of the Legislative Assembly or the Cabinet of Ministers. The position is anomalous, and I think that the best thing is to look for a practical solution rather than to try to apply some general principle which has no real application to the case. My recommendation is that the necessary funds should be found by Her Majesty's Government out of United Kingdom resources as a supplement to the monies already provided or promised for the economic development of Cyprus. It will be a worthwhile gift from the people of this country to the people of Cyprus, and at a time when such large expenditure has to be incurred in the island for the more general purposes of defence it is not a bad thing that this and other development monies should be visibly expended at the cost of the British taxpayer for the direct benefit of the internal purposes of Cyprus.

60. My proposals therefore call for financial contributions from the United Kingdom to two special purposes—to pay for part of internal security and to pay for inter-communal education. I think that the reasons why these contributions are called for are valid independently of the rise or fall of Cyprus revenues in general or the taxing policy pursued by the Cypriot Government, because these reasons arise out of the constitutional structure itself. On the other hand, it is my view that, if these contributions are measured and provided as I have proposed, they close any question of further contributions from United Kingdom sources in general aid of the Cyprus budget. Cyprus is not, so far as any investigations of mine have led me, one of those territories which should require or expect a grant in aid in supplement of general administration. Nor do I think that such a system, with the attendant complications of more or less detailed Treasury inspection and approval of each year's budgetary position, is consonant with the conception of free and independent control of self-governing matters which I have made the basis of my constitutional proposals.

61. I could not finish this covering memorandum without acknowledging gratefully the help that I have received during the course of my work. Before I do so I may take the opportunity of stating without qualification upon what authority my proposals rest, since I would prefer them to be criticised for the merits or demerits of what they in fact contain rather than for not being what they have at no time purported to be. The sole responsibility for the proposals is mine. They are not the outcome of negotiations, since negotiations have not taken place : nor do they represent suggestions which have been made to and worked out with any or all of the parties principally concerned. The reasons that prevented the holding of any round-table conference are familiar and do not need enlargement from me. On the other hand it would be misleading to allow the impression to prevail that my proposals have been produced in ignorance of the main attitudes and positions of these parties.' Those are not difficult to ascertain for anyone who has the opportunity, as I have had, to study something of the history of Cyprus since 1878, of its constitutional controversies, and of the successive sets of proposals and discussions that are recorded from time to time up to the present day. Moreover, during the two visits to Cyprus that I have paid in the last four months I have not lacked means of learning at first hand of the attitude of the Turkish Cypriots, which has been presented to me officially, or something at first or second hand of the points of view of the Greek Cypriot and of the other communities in Cyprus.

62. I have received sincere and generous assistance from the Governor of Cyprus, His Excellency Sir John Harding, his staff and all members of the administration in Cyprus, British, Greek and Turkish, with whom I was brought into contact. They spared no effort to make my visits informative or to make it possible for me to see and hear what I could during the time that I was there. The members of the Colonial Office in London whom I have called upon for advice have always been ready to let me draw upon their fund of knowledge and experience. Lastly, I can put on record my grateful appreciation of the services rendered by the two secretaries of my Commission, Mr. Geoffrey Cassels in Cyprus and Mr. Derek Pearson of the Colonial Office, without whose able co-operation my work would have been much longer and even more difficult.



12th November, 1956.